

Structure critical risk, incident and audit data on bowtie barriers



CGE

Risk Management Solutions

Making risk understandable

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In short...

The problem:


Engineers and managers can suffer from information paucity, overload, delayed delivery or indigestible and unrelated data.

The solution:

Combine risk, audit, incident and equipment state data onto bowtie barriers for a fourfold view of barrier management.



There's Beauty in big data




When data gets ugly

DATA:
Incidents
Audits
Equipment
MoC
PTW

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 104

Cause

- Data paucity or overload
- Not verified / verifiable
- Poorly structured
- Incongruous sources
- Indigestible
- Meaningless / misapplied



Effect

- Poor decisions
- Repeated incidents
- Production delays

Big Data

Failure

- 1958, Int'l Geo Year project.
1000s of researchers

Photographs | spectrograms | maps,
observation logs | tables | charts,
documentary films | technical reports.


**> too much data,
too many platforms**

<https://www.chemheritage.org/distillations/magazine/information-overload>

Success

- “1840, fossil classes...
Bronn realized...
to order chaos
= to visualize information
and so learn something
from it.”

- Also, Linnaeus



Diverse sources and voices?

Audit data



Risk analysis

data


Equipment live

Incident


state data



D-ZN1-G1 Unit 010 Zone 1 ...	Off (+7/-6)	No more than 2 sub
4431A Toxic Gas Detector	Online	2017 Aug 15 22:34:
4431B Toxic Gas Detector	Off	2017
4431C Toxic Gas Detector	Online	2017
4431D Toxic Gas Detector	Online	2017
4431E Toxic Gas Detector	Off	2017
4431F Toxic Gas Detector	Off	2017
4431G Toxic Gas Detector	Online	2017
4431H Toxic Gas Detector	Off	2017
4431I Toxic Gas Detector	Online	2017
4431J Toxic Gas Detector	Off	2017
4431K Toxic Gas Detector	Online	2017
4431L Toxic Gas Detector	Off	2017
4431M Toxic Gas Detector	Online	2017





Even more beautiful data



Finding a common language

Gas Detector	Online	2017 Aug 15 22:30
Toxic Gas Detector	Off	2017 Aug 15 22:30
Toxic Gas Detector	Online	2017 Aug 15 22:30
Toxic Gas Detector	Online	2017 Aug 15 22:30
Toxic Gas Detector	Off	2017 Aug 15 22:30
Toxic Gas Detector	Off	2017 Aug 15 22:30
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Toxic Gas Detector	Online	2017 Aug 15 22:30




What diagrams do

Diagrams enhance cognitive processes (inference and prediction)

'Thinking with Diagrams', A. Blackwell (2001)


Station	Line(s)[*]	Local Authority	Zone(s)
Acton Town	District	Ealing	
	Piccadilly		
	Hammersmith & City ^[d]		
Aldgate East	District	Tower Hamlets	
All Saints	DLR (Stratford Branch)	Tower Hamlets	
Alperton	Piccadilly ^[h]	Brent	
Amersham	Metropolitan	Chiltern	
Angel	Northern	Islington	
Arnos Grove	Piccadilly	Enfield	
Arsenal	Piccadilly	Islington	
	Hammersmith & City		
Balham	Northern	Wandsworth	3



Truth – often complex
and unfathomable

Models of the truth –
more comprehensible

Effective models of “our view of truth”




Basic uses of a Bowtie diagram

- to **Structure thinking** - how things happen
- for **Risk-based decisions** and **ALARP**
- for **Monitoring barrier performance** / audits
- for **Capture and share safety critical info**
- for **Risk communication up/down** / training
- for **Safety cases** / **Safety reports**

Proactive and Reactive


Add value




Incident analysis - four strategies

Incident type	Strategy
1. Simple incident	Form
2. Unique disaster	Stand-alone incident analysis
3 Serious and partly predictable	Incident analysis /w BowTies (combi of 2 & 4)
4. Serious but predictable	SIR (Scenario-based Incident Registration)

BSCAT




Tripod Beta





The 3 barrier-based methods

Barrier Failure Analysis




Root Cause Analysis





BowTie Risk Assessment



Incident analysis



Overlay incidents onto barriers

BowTieXP risk analysis



AuditXP


Surveying barriers and MS

Barrier Compliance with Standards




Audit approaches

Traditional



Barrier-based



e.g. similar to deep dive audit:

- Barrier design
- Barriers are installed
- Barriers maintained & tested
- Barriers are used
- Personnel are competent

Questions on barriers

OG-H.01
Hydrocarbons
during well
testing

**Uncontrolled
release of
hydrocarbons
at surface
from test
equipment**

**Flame failure
at flare booms
(flare out)**

**Test of ignition
system prior to
well test**

OG-Q.01 Is a flare boom ignition test performed before every well test?

OG-Q.02 Is the protocol for a flare boom ignition test known to the personnel?

**Flare booms are
under continual
surveillance / fire
watch**

OG-Q.04 Do the personnel know who is responsible for the flare boom pilot light?

**Manual shut in at
well test choke
manifold**

OG-Q.05 Is the procedure for manual well shut-in known?

OG-Q.06 Do the personnel know when a manual well shut-in is required?

**Corrosion /
Erosion of well
test
equipment**

**Flow process
analysis**

OG-Q.09 Is the well testing equipment designed around the flow process analysis of the task at hand?

Sand detectors

OG-Q.10 Are sand detectors are in place?

OG-Q.11 Does the personnel know how to interpret sand detector data?

**Well testing
equipment is
pressure tested**

OG-Q.07 Is the well testing equipment tested by a certified company?

OG-Q.08 Is the well testing equipment tested under realistic modes of operation?

Simplified display option


**Well testing
equipment is
pressure tested**

OG-Q.07

OG-Q.08

Barrier-based audit

- Results focus on risks, not categories
- Easy to detect weak spots
- Potential for multi-barrier impact
- MS tasks / procedures can still be audited ✓



Equipment

Current breakdown status

Integrate maintenance backlog




MAERSK
DRILLING

centrica

+ more

Systems and Barrier **online**

Set your own rule. e.g.
2 tag items offline
= OK




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Systems and Barrier **offline**


Set your own rule.
e.g.
3 tag items offline
= subsystem offline
1 subsystem offline =
barrier offline



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Barrier Management:



Know your barriers:

Barrier function:

The task or role of a barrier. (e.g. prevent leaks or ignition)



Barrier (system):


One or more elements.



Barrier element:

Tasks, equipment measures

Barrier Management data in BowTieXP



Reporting possibilities

BowTieServer BowTies Reports Audits Compliance Treatment HAZID Wiki WorkBowTie								
Barrier	# Incidents	# Times	# Ineffective State	Criticality	Effectiveness	Type	Audit	
Slip recovery competence	13	21	12			Poor	Active hardware	
Use Ex equipment	11	11	10			Not Critical	Good	
Watchman	15	19	10			Critical	Good	
Ventilate, monitor and test for toxic/flammable gas	10	10	9			Not Critical	Good	
Weather check & avoid driving	5	7	6			Not Critical	Good	
Defensive driving	7	9	6			Not Critical	Good	
Ventilate, monitor and test oxygen level	5	5	5			Not Critical	Good	
Use respirator (air-supplying/air-purifying)	12	12	5			Not Critical	Very Poor	
Use full chest harness + lifeline	7	7	4			Not Critical	Good	

RS-Actn-01

Pressure Safety Valve

Active hardware

Off (+0/-0)

RS-Q.09 n=4

RS-Q.08 n=4

Used on 2 Incidents

Used on 2 Incident Barriers

Failed: 1

Missing: 1

Inadequate: 0

Unreliable: 0

Effective: 0

IC5 (1)

BC13.8 (1)

MSF10.3 (1)

Thank you

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


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Risk Management Solutions

Making risk understandable

CCPS – Publishing next quarter



(Not actual book
appearance)